The Twentieth-century World: An International History, William R. Keylor, Oxford University Press, 2001, 0195136810, 9780195136814, 612 pages. This highly successful text offers a narrative account of twentieth-century international history with extensive coverage given to the United States, Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. The book uses a distinctive analytical framework in order to examine the evolving relations between the major world powers throughout the last century. Now in its fourth edition, The Twentieth-Century World has been thoroughly updated to reflect the full span of the twentieth century up through the year 2000. Keylor expands his coverage of such recent events as the Middle East peace process, NATO expansion, negotiations for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the war in Chechnya. This new edition includes a completely up-to-date bibliographical essay and 27 maps for ease of reference. Its clear and concise style make The Twentieth-Century World an essential text for courses on twentieth-century international history.

DOWNLOAD [http://kgarch.org/1jkuFSb](http://kgarch.org/1jkuFSb)

States and Social Revolutions A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China, Theda Skocpol, Feb 28, 1979, History, 407 pages. Theda Skocpol shows how all three combine to explain the origins and accomplishments of social-revolutionary transformations.

Understanding international conflicts an introduction to theory and history, Joseph S. Nye, 2003, Political Science, 275 pages. Part of the Longman Classics in Political Science Series, this highly readable and respected book balances history and theory to give international politics students a ....

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 the Baltic case, I. Joseph Vizulis, 1990, 176 pages. This volume analyzes the effects of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 on the Baltic States and Eastern Europe. This Nazi-Soviet non-aggression treaty catapulted into ....

A Thread of Years , John Lukacs, 1998, History, 481 pages. A distinguished historian presents a series of vignettes of daily life, both in the U.S. and abroad, between 1901 and 1969, that together become a poignant history of manners ....

Understanding International Relations , Chris Brown, 2001, Political Science, 296 pages. For students approaching the subject of international relations for the first time, this work covers the main theoretical approaches and shows how they can be applied to ....

Politics among nations the struggle for power and peace, Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Kenneth W. Thompson, 1985, Political Science, 688 pages. For more than four decades, "Politics Among Nations," has been considered by many to be the premiere text in international politics. This brief edition--edited by Professor ....


A history of the world in the twentieth century , John Ashley Soames Grenville, 1994, History, 973 pages. In this enlargement of his outstanding history of the world, Grenville stresses the history of nation-states within a world of interdependence and regional groupings. The ....

Twentieth century the history of the world, 1901 to 2000, John Morris Roberts, 1999, 905 pages. A all-encompassing look at the twentieth century by a respected historian examines the most influential events of the last hundred years in chronological order with an eye ....


Outlines & Highlights for the Twentieth-century World and Beyond An International History Since 1900, Cram101 Textbook Reviews, William R. Keylor, Dec 31, 2009, 188 pages. Never HIGHLIGHT a Book Again! Virtually all testable terms, concepts, persons, places, and events are included. Cram101 Textbook Outlines gives all of the outlines, highlights ....

The Twentieth Century World, Fiona Reynolds, David Taylor, 1998, History, Modern, 96 pages. "Living Through History" is a complete Key Stage 3 course which brings out the exciting events in history. The course is available in two different editions, Core and ....

The Twentieth-Century World and Beyond: An International History since 1900 explores the history of modern relations between the U.S., Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. The book's unique analytical framework--which focuses on the relationships between and among countries rather than on individual histories--helps students easily examine how the nations of the world have interacted since the beginning of the last century. The Twentieth-Century World and Beyond, Sixth Edition, is ideal for undergraduate and graduate courses in twentieth-century world history, and courses in international relations and international studies.

"The Twentieth Century World is the best single volume survey of international history, and it is even better in this new edition. Clear, comprehensive, and beautifully balance, it has been a consistent favorite among my students. I don't remember any textbook getting the same kind of uniformly enthusiastic reviews."--James Sheehan, Stanford University

"This fine synthesis adroitly combines regional, national, and transnational levels of analysis into a coherent narrative of twentieth century history. It provides an excellent guide to both the violence that marked this period in history as well humanity's efforts to cope with it."--Emily S. Rosenberg, University of California, Irvine

Dr. Keylor portrays the political, diplomatic and military history of the twentieth century in the most understandable and straightforward language. He shows how history is responsible for what is currently happening around us, and why we should know the causes of the conflicts he writes about. He pays special attention to World War One, the rise of facism, World War Two, the rise of the Cold War, Latin America and the US, Africa, the Cold War in Asia, Israel and the Middle East, the triumph of and expansion of capitalism throughout Latin America and East Asia, the end of the Cold War, arms control and many other topics. The book is a very valuable reference for any student of law, international relations, politics or anyone else who wants to know more about the world that we live in.

This concrete account of international relations in the twentieth century stands out in its clarity and coherence. And unlike many history books, it's not BORING, perhaps because it offers more than merely a narrative account; it is also set within an analytical framework. My attention was thoroughly held as Professor Keylor imparted his insight into the struggle among the major nations in the world for power, prosperity and prestige. Everything seemed to click into place, and the chapters just flow into one another. As Paul Kennedy said of it: "...The style is pleasing and extremely lucid, and the emphasis on economic and geopolitical trends is greatly to be welcomed... An excellent synthetic work, and one which can be recommended to students and to interested laymen alike."

The Twentieth-Century World: An International History, by Dr. William R. Keylor, has been recognized as one of the foremost sources for a historical account of the twentieth century by several professors, students, and other applicable parties alike, and for good reason. There are several factors to take into account when determining the merit of such a text, including the tenability of the text, the efficiency of its organization, the cogency of its material, and its physical practicalities in terms of design and dimension, not to mention the price. This text is an assessment, in narrative form of twentieth-century world history which provides comprehensive coverage of affairs related to the United States, Latin America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, all of which is up to date as recently as the year two thousand. Dr. Keylor presents the political, diplomatic and military history of the twentieth century while putting an appropriate significance on the effects of economics as well as on the bearing that geopolitics has over a country, both of which are often overlooked. In doing so, this text sheds light on important yet presumably subtle factors that have
played important roles in the development of twentieth-century international history. While this account of international relations in the twentieth century is not only concise and depicted with convincing sensibility, Dr. Keylor manages to accomplish this with coherency and clarity, which substantiates a prepossessing flow from page to page. Perhaps one of the most appealing factors of this text is the language, which is straightforward and understandable without diminishing the quality of the material or compromising its effectiveness. In fact, this method likely affords Dr. Keylor to reach a wider audience that ranges from the individual with only an intermediate comprehension, to the educated and experienced history buff. Furthermore, another important element of this text is its ability to cover the history of the twentieth century concisely and clearly, in an intense analytical framework without boring the reader. This fact is among many of the others which separate it from many of its rivals. Read more &rsquo;

The Twentieth Century World opens with a prologue that examines international relations at the outset of the twentieth century and sets the stage for the rest of the book. The book's three major sections then examine the period bracketed by the two world wars, which was characterized by German expansionist aspirations and attempts by the other major powers to contain them, the cold war era characterized by superpower rivalry, and the post-cold war era characterized by increasing disorder in international relations.

Author William Keylor is consistently strong in describing how geopolitical forces - geography, demographics, technology, and finance - affect national development and international relations. He shows that political arrangements need to be consistent with the operation of these forces to be successful. But he does not imagine that international relations are determined entirely by objective forces: he recognizes that ideas are important too. For example, because it holds itself out as a model of democracy, the United States is judged by the same ideals that it professes. The ideologies of democracy and national self-determination advanced by the United States have not eliminated its self-interested behavior but they have constrained it. Keylor also recognizes the role of leadership in international relations. For example, he describes how competent and farsighted leadership in many Asian countries has helped produce impressive economic growth over a period of many decades, lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and exerting pressure on neighboring countries to adopt similar export-oriented policies.

In fact, I found his explanation of development processes in East Asia to be particularly illuminating. He describes how Japan pioneered a development path based on trade and government coordination of large, oligarchic export companies. Japan first specialized in textiles and other manufactures that relied on cheap labor. By postponing consumption and sustaining a high rate of savings and investment over an extended period of time, the Japanese achieved a comparative advantage in accumulating capital for investment in capital-intensive manufacturing industries. Finally, having developed a cadre of highly qualified scientists, technicians, and engineers, the Japanese became world leaders in high technology industry. This same developmental path was successfully replicated by the Asian Tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong), and is being followed now by the ASEAN countries.

The Twentieth Century World, now in its fourth edition, is suitable for lower-division undergraduate courses and will also be of interest to the general reader. It includes many useful and attractive maps but no footnotes. The book also includes a 23-page critical bibliography, two glossaries, and a detailed, reliable index. Since I finished the book a couple months ago, it has served me as a reference several times. Read more &rsquo;

Through a distinctive analytical framework that focuses on the relations between countries rather than their individual histories, this second Canadian edition offers an engaging narrative account of twentieth-century world history. Thoroughly updated, this new edition provides expanded coverage of the non-Western world and includes a brand new chapter covering the first decade of the twenty-first century - exploring such recent historical events as Canada's mission in Afghanistan and the Copenhagen Climate Summit. With its impeccable scholarship and even-handed analysis, The Twentieth-Century World, second Canadian edition, is an essential resource for all students of twentieth-century history.
When the advancing armies of the United States and the Soviet Union met at the Elbe River in the heart of Germany on April 25, 1945, the exhilarating prospect of victory and peace momentarily overshadowed the political disagreements between their respective governments that had surfaced at the Crimea conference two and a half months earlier. Within a week word had arrived of Hitler's death by his own hand and the capitulation of the German armies in Italy and Austria. The formal surrender by German military authorities on May 7 merely confirmed what had been known for months to be a foregone conclusion: the collapse of the Nazi imperium in Europe. Though the Allied soldiers encamped along the opposite banks of the Elbe and in other liberated regions of the continent anticipated redeployment to the Far East for the final drive against the receding military forces of Japan, the end of the most destructive military contest in history was, at long last, in sight. The promise of a return to civilian pursuits and the renewal of familial attachments engendered the customary euphoria that attends the conclusion of great wars. For a brief moment, in the afterglow of triumph for what was universally felt to be a supremely worthy cause, the peoples and political leaders of the two preeminent powers in the victorious coalition could celebrate the dawn of a new era of world peace.

But the convergence of American and Russian military power at the center of the devastated continent of Europe in the spring of 1945 signified something of critical significance for the future of the world beyond the immediate reality of Germany's defeat. Amid the universal expressions of relief on "Victory in Europe" day, or VE day, as it was to be widely called, there remained a number of disturbing facts about the way in which the war against Hitler had been brought to a close that were to prevent the restoration of the peacetime conditions for which all of the belligerent populations yearned.

Foremost among these postwar realities was the disappearance of all forms of indigenous political authority and military power in Central Europe as the German state disintegrated and its war machine ground to a halt. This condition had been foreordained by the Allied leaders' decision to impose upon the vanquished enemy an unconditional surrender that would assure the instantaneous destruction of all German political and military institutions. The unprecedented brutality of the Nazi occupation of Europe had inspired in the victorious coalition the determination to rid the continent once and for all of the scourge of German power. The war against Hitler had assumed the character of a moral crusade against a monstrous evil that had to be subdued and then permanently eliminated for the benefit of humanity. In striking contrast to Wilson's discriminating policy at the end of the First World War, Roosevelt declined to distinguish between the objectionable regime of the enemy state and the civilian population that it had ruled. The Führer was regarded merely as the agent of a German people whose instinctual propensity for aggression disqualified it from playing any role whatsoever in the postwar reorganization of Europe.

This moralistic justification of the American war effort, developed for domestic consumption to justify the painful public sacrifices required for the waging of total war, camouflaged the principal reason for America's intervention in the European struggle, which was to redress the balance of power on the continent that had been disturbed by Germany's bid for hegemony. But the dissolution of the Nazi administrative and military apparatus by the Allied powers, followed by their refusal to countenance the prompt reconstitution of a German successor regime, produced the vacuum in Central Europe that Churchill had foreseen before the Yalta Conference. This vacuum was inevitably to be filled by the military power of the advancing armies that converged upon the center of the continent from west and east in the spring of 1945.

In this way the informal partition of liberated Europe into pro-Western and pro-Soviet spheres was dictated by the military situation at the moment of Germany's collapse. Each of the two zones
eventually adopted political institutions, economic practices, and foreign policies that reflected the preferences and influences of its liberator. France, Belgium, Greece, and Italy, in spite of the presence of powerful Communist movements that had played a significant role in resisting the German occupation of their countries, reestablished Western-style parliamentary systems and capitalist economic structures while adapting their foreign policies to the Anglo-American vision of the postwar world. The states on the eastern half of the continent, despite the ideological hostility to Communism and nationalistic antipathy for Russia that characterized the recent history of most of them, adopted Soviet political and economic models and supported the Kremlin's foreign policy goals under the watchful eyes of the Russian occupation armies and their civilian collaborators among the indigenous population.

This ideological bifurcation of Europe did not occur overnight. In the Soviet sphere, non-Communist political parties were permitted to operate and non-Communist leaders to participate in coalition governments in all of the Eastern European states for a few years after the war; similarly, the Communist parties of France, Italy, and Belgium were not only tolerated but allowed to hold cabinet posts in the early postwar coalitions in those countries. But one salient feature of the postwar political situation in Europe eventually caused the division of that continent into two mutually antagonistic blocs of states respectively identified with the superpower whose military forces had emancipated them from German rule: This was the unwavering determination of the Soviet government to establish a ring of subservient client states in Eastern Europe along the broad invasion route stretching from the western shore of the Black Sea to the eastern shore of the Baltic that had brought marauding armies to the heart of Russia twice within the memory of most of its citizens still alive in 1945.

We have seen how Stalin's insistence on securing border rectifications at the expense of Finland, Poland, and Romania to enhance the security of Russia's western frontier had won the reluctant assent of the Western powers. But the Kremlin's subsequent attempt to promote, through political intimidation backed by the presence of the Red Army, the installation of pro-Soviet regimes in the states of Eastern Europe beyond the newly expanded frontiers was to provoke increasing opposition from Washington. In time a momentous evolution in the strategic thinking of policy-makers in the Truman administration took place. American officials began to ponder the implications of the developments unfolding on the eastern half of the European continent in light of historical precedent and geographical context. Great Britain and, belatedly, the United States had intervened in the two European wars of the twentieth century to restore the balance of power that had been upset by Germany. The temporary elimination of German power at the end of the First World War had been preceded a year earlier by the temporary disappearance of Russian power. The simultaneous weakness of Germany and Russia in the decade of the 1920s had enabled the small states of Eastern Europe to preserve their independence from both of their potentially powerful neighbors with the support and encouragement of France. Hitler's subsequent bid for German hegemony in Europe had also resulted in the erasure of German power, but this time Russian power had been projected into the political and military void of Eastern Europe at a time when no nation or coalition of nations on the Western half of the continent was strong enough to balance it. The tough-minded realism of geopolitics, so familiar to European strategists and statesmen, began to replace the Wilsonian reveries of Roosevelt in the minds of the foreign policy advisers of the new American president: Russia was rapidly acquiring control of the heartland of Eurasia. The military exhaustion and economic distress of the nations along the western rim of Europe exposed them to the threat of Soviet domination as well. A Russian-controlled continental empire stretching from the Sea of Japan to the Atlantic and from the Arctic to the Aegean would be better positioned to mount a drive for world dominion than Nazi Germany had been at the height of its power. What may have appeared to Stalin as a legitimate attempt to bolster the security of Russia's vulnerable western frontier by the formation of compliant buffer states beyond it was increasingly interpreted in Washington as the beginning of a Russian drive for continental hegemony on the road to mastery of the globe. The ominous prophecy of Mackinder returned to haunt those who had confidently expected that the end of the fighting would bring the peace and security earnestly sought by all: "Who rules east Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island rules the world."
The establishment of Russian hegemony over the reconstituted states of Eastern Europe from 1945 through 1948 was accomplished with impunity because the only nation capable of preventing it had disengaged militarily from the European continent. At the time of Germany's defeat the numerical strength of the armed forces of the United States exceeded 12 million. By the end of 1947 that number had fallen to 1.4 million as a consequence of the abolition of universal military conscription and a drastic reduction in the size of the professional armed services. The demobilization of America's military forces and the dismantling of its war industries transpired at a time when the Soviet Union kept over 4 million battle-seasoned veterans under arms-down from the 12 million wartime level-and retained the formidable arsenal of weaponry with which it had driven the German army from Moscow to Berlin.

The reasons for this precipitous disengagement of American military power from Europe after the Second World War are easy to appreciate, as ill advised as it may have appeared in retrospect. The American public, accustomed to small volunteer armies in peacetime, had no inclination to tolerate the retention of an American military presence in postwar Europe beyond the token forces required for occupation duty in Germany, Austria, and Italy. The United States had entered the European war for the purpose of destroying the Nazi regime and eliminating German military power from the continent. Once those two objectives had been achieved, only an American government endowed with superhuman powers of persuasion could have induced its war-weary citizens to bear the enormous costs and manifold inconveniences of maintaining large military forces across the Atlantic solely for the purpose of balancing the undiminished military might of a nation that had so recently been hailed as a trusted ally against Hitler.

The American public's inclination to "bring the boys home," reflected in expressions of Congressional sentiment and recorded in the opinion polls of the period, was entirely consistent with the Roosevelt administration's master plan for the political organization of the postwar world. The American commander in chief during the Second World War shared the optimistic expectation of his predecessor during the First World War that the defeat of Germany would herald a new era in which international conciliation would supplant the operation of the balance of power as the mechanism for the preservation of world order. The United Nations Organization, conceived by American, British, and Russian representatives at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in the autumn of 1944 and formally established by the delegates of fifty states meeting in San Francisco from April through June 1945, was designed to supersede the discredited League of Nations and resume its noble purpose with more effective means. Since both the United States and the Soviet Union shared, along with Great Britain, France, and China, permanent representation on the new organization's decision-making body, the Security Council, it was widely assumed that such disagreements as might arise among the great powers over the postwar political settlement could be amicably adjudicated in the United Nations without recourse to the old practices of power politics and regional alliance systems that had been so decisively discredited in the course of the previous decade.

Furthermore, the American monopoly on nuclear weaponry in the early postwar years reinforced the traditional sense of invulnerability to external aggression that had long nourished the national proclivity for isolationism. The United States had intervened in the two world wars on the assumption that the subjugation of Europe and the control of its resources and Atlantic bases by a single aggressive power would perforce pose an unacceptable threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere. In the first few years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, America's ability to devastate the principal cities of any potential aggressor without the slightest risk of retaliation against its own territory seemed to afford a greater degree of protection than even the Atlantic Ocean ever could. Such a condition of strategic omnipotence was scarcely conducive to the sentiment of national insecurity that would have been required to generate broad public support for the assumption of extensive military commitments abroad so soon after the end of the war. Particularly in light of Roosevelt's tacit endorsement of Soviet predominance in the half of Europe that was liberated by the Red Army, his successor was in no position to contest the Kremlin's exercise of that prerogative beyond innocuous expressions of displeasure at the inevitable violations of the rights of the populations concerned.

The Truman administration forcefully challenged the expansion of Soviet power only when it
appeared to surpass the demarcation line separating the two spheres of influence that had been tacitly recognized by the Allied leaders at the wartime conferences. During the years 1946 and 1947 a series of political developments along the southern rim of Eurasia was viewed by Western leaders as evidence of a coordinated Soviet effort to attain one of the traditional objectives of Russian foreign policy: expansion southward toward the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, a region historically under the sway of British power.

The site of the first direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the Western powers was Iran, a country whose strategic location had rendered it the object of Russian and British rivalry as early as the end of the nineteenth century. As we have seen, these two imperial powers had jointly partitioned the country into spheres of influence in the decade prior to the First World War. The collapse of the Tsarist empire and the advent of the Bolshevik regime had temporarily resulted in a diminution of Russian influence in Iran; Great Britain proceeded to organize and supervise the exploitation of the vast reserves of petroleum that had recently been discovered there while striving to establish predominant political influence over the government in Teheran. In August 1941, as Hitler's armies advanced deep into the Soviet Union, Russian and British military forces simultaneously entered Iran and promptly replaced the increasingly pro-German regime of Reza Shah with a more compliant government headed by his teenaged son, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi. According to the terms of an Anglo-Russian-Iranian treaty concluded on January 29, 1942, Russian troops were stationed in northern Iran and British troops in the south to protect the vital supply route from the Persian Gulf to the Russian frontier along which British and American arms were transported to the Soviet Union. Both foreign occupation forces, as well as the American contingent that later joined the British troops in the southern zone, were to be withdrawn within six months of the end of the war. Shortly after the cessation of hostilities, the Communist-controlled Tudeh party fomented a separatist revolt in the northwestern province of Azerbaijan bordering on the Soviet Union. The Russian occupation army prevented the Iranian government from suppressing the insurgency by denying its military forces access to the rebellious province. In November a provincial assembly dominated by the Tudeh party was elected in Azerbaijan and promptly declared its autonomy, a move that was widely regarded as the first step toward the absorption of the province by the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan across the border. The Iranian prime minister received a set of demands from Moscow which included indefinite retention of Soviet troops in northern Iran, recognition of the autonomy of Azerbaijan, and the formation of a Russian-Iranian joint stock company to develop the petroleum resources of the northern provinces.

Interpreting these Soviet moves as the beginning of a campaign to obtain effective control of the entire country, including its rich petroleum reserves and its ports on the Persian Gulf, the British and American governments applied vigorous diplomatic pressure on the Kremlin to terminate its Iranian adventure. Tough speeches by British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin on February 21 and American Secretary of State James Byrnes on February 28 signaled the intention of London and Washington to resist further Soviet advances in the region. When the Red Army, alone among the three wartime occupation forces, delayed its evacuation beyond the March 2, 1946, deadline, the resulting firestorm of criticism from the British and American governments prompted the Kremlin to withdraw its forces prior to the Iranian parliament's ratification of the agreement on Azerbaijan autonomy and the joint oil venture. After the Red Army completed its evacuation in May 1946, the Iranian parliament, apparently emboldened by the vigorous expressions of Anglo-American support, declined to ratify the agreement that had been concluded under duress with the Kremlin. In the meantime an American military mission had arrived in Teheran and arrangements had been made for the purchase of American military equipment by the Iranian government. The diplomatic setback suffered by the Soviet Union in the Iranian crisis of 1946 was a direct consequence of the Truman administration's decision to join Great Britain in protecting this historic object of Russian expansionist ambition. Washington's determination to bolster the Pahlevi regime set the stage for the establishment seven years later of an intimate security link between Washington and Teheran that was to last for a quarter of a century. In a more general sense, it heralded America's determination to resist the expansion of Soviet influence throughout the world.

Just as Soviet activities in northern Iran during 1946 were viewed in Washington as evidence of the Kremlin's renewal of traditional Russian expansionism toward the Persian Gulf, simultaneous Soviet
pressures on Iran's neighbor Turkey appeared to rekindle Russian ambitions for a geopolitical offensive into the eastern Mediterranean. On March 19, 1945, Moscow had formally denounced the Turko-Soviet treaty of friendship concluded in 1925, which had established close political and economic collaboration between these two historic enemies and included reciprocal pledges of nonaggression. On June 7, 1945, Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov presented the Turkish ambassador to Moscow with a set of demands that collectively constituted a substantial infringement on Turkish sovereignty. These included the cession of territory in the Caucasus annexed by Russia in 1878 and reacquired by Turkey after the First World War, the revision of the Montreux Convention of 1936 governing the Turkish Straits so as to establish joint Russian-Turkish jurisdiction over this vital waterway, and the leasing of Soviet bases on its shores to ensure its defense.

in Manchuria at the expense of China, Stalin's diplomatic offensive against Turkey represented an attempt to restore territory or privileges previously possessed by or promised to the Russian state. Not even the demand for de facto control of the Dardenelles was new. In a modified form it had been secretly granted to the Tsarist regime by its Anglo-French allies during the First World War before the Bolshevik Revolution resulted in its repudiation. More recently, Molotov had tried in vain to secure Germany's endorsement of Russian designs on Turkey's Caucasian frontier and the Straits during the period of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Stalin had insistently raised the matter of the Straits with Churchill at Moscow in October 1944, with Roosevelt at Yalta, and with Truman at Potsdam, all without concrete result. His argument was framed in entirely defensive terms: Turkey, which had remained neutral during the war despite British and Russian bids for an alliance and permitted the sale of strategically important chrome to Germany until the spring of 1944 for fear of antagonizing Hitler, was too weak to prevent powers unfriendly to the Soviet Union from sending their warships into the Black Sea. But to the United States, Stalin's demand represented nothing less than the revival of the old dream of a Russian breakthrough to the Mediterranean at Turkey's expense, and therefore had to be resisted with the same firmness that had been displayed by Great Britain in the days when it was still capable of playing such a role.

In short, the Truman administration's response to the Turkish crisis of 1945-46 reflected the same determination to replace Britain as the principal guarantor of Russia's confinement along the southern rim of Eurasia that had prompted its vigorous resistance to Soviet pressure on Iran. To Washington, as to London during the era when the "eastern question" had preoccupied the architects of British foreign policy, Russian control of the Straits would entail domination of the eastern Mediterranean. This in turn would signify command of the vital commercial waterway linking Europe to the Orient and afford easy access to the valuable mineral resources of North Africa and the Middle East. Accordingly, when Ankara's indignant rejection of Moscow's demands precipitated a violent campaign against Turkey in the Soviet press and the deployment of twenty-five Russian divisions on the Caucasian frontier, the Truman administration resolved to bolster the beleaguered Turkish regime. In response to a harshly worded Soviet note of August 7, 1946, reiterating the Russian claims, Washington dispatched a naval task force to the eastern Mediterranean as a demonstrative show of force and on September 30 announced that a portion of the American fleet would be permanently stationed there. In the face of this ostentatious display of American naval power, which was implicitly reinforced by the American monopoly on atomic weapons, Moscow backed down at the Turkish Straits just as it was being dislodged from northern Iran, though the extent of the Soviet retrenchment was not apparent until much later.

During the Russian-American showdown over Soviet demands on Turkey, acute domestic unrest across the Aegean in Greece was viewed in London and Washington as a third aspect of the putative Russian campaign of southward expansion already in evidence in Iran and Turkey. It will be recalled that upon the evacuation of German occupation forces in Greece in November 1944, a fierce internal struggle had erupted between the conservative faction of the Greek resistance movement loyal to the monarchy and the Communist partisan organization. The intervention of British military forces in the winter of 1944-45 resulted in a truce concluded between the two factions in February 1945 as well as an agreement stipulating a referendum on the question of the restoration of the monarchy and national elections under Allied supervision. The elections of March 1946 were boycotted by the leftist political organizations and therefore produced a comfortable majority for the royalist party that was actively supported by the British. In the summer of 1946, at
the height of the Turkish crisis, thousands of Greek Communists concentrated in the north renewed their guerrilla warfare against the pro-Western government in Athens with the encouragement and material assistance of the newly established Communist states across the border, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. When the national referendum in September resulted in a large majority in favor of the restoration of the monarchy, the conflict raging on the Greek peninsula assumed the aspect of an ideological confrontation pitting the British-backed royalist regime in Athens against the Communist guerrilla movement in the north that was supplied and supported by the adjacent Communist states.